1. Among these is his Pulitzer Prize-winning Origins of the Fifth Amendment (1969) . 2. The distinction between civil and criminal forfeiture is a signifi cant one, and it is of primary concern to Levy in A License to Steal. Civil forfeiture usually, but not always, pro ceeds by way of in rem actions directed against the property itself, which is named as a party defendant. Under many in rem forfeiture statutes, the government need only establish by a "probable cause" standard of proof that the property being sued is forfeitable. Depending on the particular statute, property may be forfeitable either because it was used or intended to be used to facilitate a criminal offense, or because it represents the proceeds of illegal activity, or property that has been purchased with those proceeds. Criminal forfeiture, by contrast, is effected through traditional in personam criminal proceedings, in which the usual criminal procedural protections are observed, and property forfeiture is simply part of the sentence which may be imposed following a conviction for a specifi ed offense.
3. The book went to press shortly before the Supreme Court's decision in Bennis, 516 U.S. 442 {1996), and does not discuss the innocent-owner issues raised in that case under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. It also went to press before the Court's decision in the pair of cases consolidated as Un ited States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996) , which addressed whether successive civil forfeiture and criminal proceedings based on the same underlying offense violated Double Jeopardy. Levy does, however, discuss one of the two appellate decisions (a decision from the Ninth Circuit) that was ultimately reversed in Ursery. criminal forfeiture was not widely used through most of the coun try's history.4 Levy discusses criminal forfeiture primarily to con trast it with civil forfeiture, which affords virtually none of the procedural protections that are taken for granted in criminal prose cutions. What emerges clearly and forcefully in this book is that civil in rem forfeiture proceedings have been used -and increas ingly are being used5 -as an expedient to circumvent the usual protections accorded to defendants in criminal proceedings, and to augment federal, state, and local treasuries. Drawn primarily from secondary sources, A License to Steal is footnoted throughout and contains an excellent bibliography.
There is much of value in A License to Steal. The book provides a concise and entertaining summary of the historical origins of mod em civil and criminal forfeiture in early English law. Levy's discus sion of the old English law of "deodands" (pp. 7-20) , under which inanimate objects which accidentally caused the death of another human being were forfeited to the Crown, is informative and thought-provoking, and he provides a fascinating digression on the trial and execution of animals, a practice which began in medieval times and continues to this day in some jurisdictions (p. 11). He also summarizes the operation of the complex of statutes known as the English Navigation and Trade Acts, which were enacted in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (pp. 39-46) . Levy con cludes, as others have,6 that the deodand never truly became a part of the American COII1Ill On law (p. 14), and that the development of civil forfeiture here after Independence owes far more to the tradi tion of in rem forfeiture proceedings in English and Colonial admi ralty courts (p. 39).
A License to Steal includes a number of contemporary accounts of civil forfeiture abuse,7 some drawn from reported cases and 4. The discussion of contemporary criminal forfeiture in A License to Steal focuses pri marily on two relatively recent revivals of criminal forfeiture that were enacted at the federal level, in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and in The Con tinuing Criminal Enterprise Act (CCE). [Vol. 96:1910 others from media reports or official investigations into abuse. 8 Levy makes clear that the abuses described in these compelling ac counts -including the forfeiture of property of completely blame less persons -are attributable to the one-sided powers accorded to government in effecting forfeitures. These include the right of au thorities to seize, without prior notice or a hearing, cash or personal property simply on the basis that there is "probable cause" to be lieve it is forfeitable,9 and the placement of the burden of proving that the property is not forfeitable on the property owner in the ensuing forfeiture proceeding. to While A License to Steal provides important historical informa tion, and does much to expose the use of civil forfeiture as a tool of tyranny, the book suffers somewhat from the uneven quality of its writing and from errors in the analysis of certain cases and statutes. In general, the writing ....:. ._ _ or perhaps the editing -does not seem to be up to the usual high standard of Levy's prior books. There
In one especially notorious case recounted by Levy that was the subject of a Pulitzer
Prize-winning series of investigative reports in the Orlando Sentinel, sheriff's deputies in Vo lusia County, Florida (which encompasses Daytona Beach) routinely stopped drivers on In terstate 95, most of them African Americans, on the thinnest of pretexts and seized whatever cash they were carrying on "suspicion" that it was "tainted" money. In the ovenvhelming majority of cases, no criminal charges were ever brought against the affected drivers, and their only recourse under Florida law was to hire an attorney and to either prove that the cash that had been taken from them was not "tainted" or to try to effectuate a settlement for return of some of it. Millions of dollars were seized in this fashion over a several-year period. 9. The ex parte seizure of cash or cars, prior to obtaining a judgment in a forfeiture pro ceeding, gives the government considerable leverage to extort cash settlements in exchange for either not bringing or dismissing the forfeiture proceeding. Recently, the Supreme Court has curbed that abuse somewhat by holding that, at least in the case of real property, due process precludes the ex parte seizure of property during the pendency of an in rem forfeiture proceeding against it. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U. S. 43 (1993) . See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
10. Under many forfeiture statutes, the owner must prove, usually by a preponderance of the evidence, that the acts giving rise to the forfeiture did not occur. See, e.g., United States v. Two Parcels of Property Located at 19 and 25 Castle Street, 31 F.3d 35, 39 (2d Cir. 1994 ). If such acts were committed by somebody other than the owner, some forfeiture statutes authorize forfeiture regardless of whether the owner knew of or consented to the misuse of his or her property. See, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996) (addressing constitu tionality of forfeiture under Michigan statute that had been construed by state courts to per mit forfeitures without regard to owner's knowledge). Other civil forfeiture statutes afford innocent-owner defenses, but even then the burden of proving lack of complicity in the wrongful use of one's property by another is placed on the owner. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(C) (Supp. 1997) (providing that "no conveyance shall be forfeited ... to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge, consent or willful blindness of the owner").
are some awkward constructions,11 and the writing too often lacks the precision,12 clarity,13 and economy that one would expect in a book of this kind.
There are also mistakes in Levy's explanations of the operation of particular forfeiture statutes, and of the holdings in several re cent Supreme Court forfeiture decisions. For example, in discuss ing the criminal forfeiture provisions of the federal drug law,14 Levy asserts that "the judgment of forfeiture in a criminal case is based on a jury's determination that the defendant is guilty and that be yond all reasonable doubt the property was somehow involved in the crime" (p. 170). In fact, correctly or not, the courts that have addressed this issue have construed the statute to require that, con sistent \vith traditional rules for factfinding at the sentencing stage, the relationship between the property and the crime need only be established by a mere preponderance of the evidence. 15 Levy also incorrectly describes the effect of the position the gov ernment took in United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop erty. 1 6 Levy asserts that " [r] ecognition of the government's 11. See, e.g., p. 89 ("Decisions in forfeiture cases are by no means against the property owner if the government has proceeded against him criminally."); p. 105 ("Civil forfeiture cases start with forfeiture because the relation-back doctrine gives the government title to the property at the moment it was used for criminal purposes -if a court subsequently agrees.").
12. For example, Levy sometimes states legal doctrines in categorical terms, only later to elaborate significant qualifications to those doctrines. He asserts, for instance, that, in civil forfeiture, "the guilt or the innocence ... is simply an extraneous matter of no legal concern," p. 22, and that "in civil forfeiture, the owner's guilt or innocence is irrelevant," p. 138. While this is true of many civil forfeiture statutes, other statutes do provide such defenses, and, indeed, such defenses are the subject of a rather extensive discussion in a later chapter of his book. Pp. 161-76. Another example is to be found in the preface. There, elaborating on the situations in which property implicated in a crime may be forfeited, he states that " [t] he property may be used to commit the crime, be its product, or be obtained with its fruits." P. ix. He then adds that, whether civil or criminal, "the forfeiture has a punishing effect." P. x.' But later in the book, Levy suggests, almost in passing, that "[t]he forfeiture of narcotics proceeds does not have to be seen as criminal punishment; it is, rather, merely depriving a narcotics felon of assets that were never rightly his." P. 189.
13. For example, in an otherwise generally accurate discussion of Un ited States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, Rumson, New Je rsey, 507 U.S. 111 (1993), Levy, after describing the holding in the case, adds this observation: "In effect, the Court did what Congress should have done: amend the 1984 act dealing with real property to include the innocent owner's defense." P. 174. The forfeiture provision at issue in 92 Buena Vzsta Avenue was not, how ever, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7), the provision that authorizes the forfeiture of real property used or intended to be used to facilitate the commission of a drug offense. Instead, it was 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6), a provision added in 1978 that authorized, inter alia, the forfeiture of "all proceeds traceable" to an illegal drug transaction. And since both provisions were enacted with innocent-owner defenses, it is difficult to assess what Levy was thinking of when he made this remark.
14. 18 u.s.c. § 853 (1988 [ Vol. 96:1910 argument would have meant that innocent owners would be unable to show that a violation involving their property had occurred with out their knowledge or consent" (p. 192) . In fact, the Court's adop tion of the government's argument would not have precluded the assertion of the innocent owner defense altogether; rather, it simply would have restricted the purposes for which the defense could be offered. The government in James Daniel Good Real Property sought the power to seize ex parte a home prior to obtaining a judg ment in an in rem forfeiture hearing, and to begin collecting the rents being paid by the owner's tenant. Nothing in the govern ment's position would, as a legal matter, have precluded the owner from asserting his innocence as a defense to the forfeiture action. The owner would instead have been precluded from making that argument (or any other) to contest the right of the government to seize control of the home before entry of judgment.17 I. A PROPOSAL FOR A PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS-BASED PROHIBITION AGAINST THE USE OF CIVIL FORFEITURE OUTSIDE !Ts TRADITIONAL APPLICATIONS IN REVENUE, MARITIME, AND WAR POWER CASES Perhaps because Levy's approach in A License to Steal is pri marily historical rather than analytical, his book does not attempt to develop any broad theory for determining whether a particular use of civil, as opposed to criminal forfeiture is constitutional. Nor does he ever acknowledge that the history and rationale of Eight eenth-and Nineteenth-Century uses of civil forfeiture could be rel evant to assessing the constitutionality of a contemporary civil forfeiture statute (or its application) that goes far beyond the lim ited scope of early civil forfeiture. Indeed, since Levy condemns certain early civil forfeitures with the same passion with which he condemns other civil forfeitures (pp. 57-58) , he may well be unwill ing to concede the constitutionality of any application of civil forfei ture, including applications that were utilized in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries in this country, and in England and her colonies in earlier periods. · 17. Also referring to the Court's decision in Ja mes Daniel Good Real Property, Levy notes that "[i]n 1993, the Supreme Court, which had had difficulty seeing that civil forfeiture can constitute punishment as well as a remedy, sensibly decided a Fifth Amendment due process case." . Though the Court's decisions do reveal hopelessly inconsistent conclusions about the punitive nature of forfeiture, see infra notes 89-95 and accompanying text, several months prior to the Ja mes Daniel Good Real Property decision, the Court had in fact declared forfeiture under two provisions of the federal drug forfeiture statute to be puni tive, as Levy himself later acknowledges. P. 202 (discussing Austin v. United States, 509 U.S.
(1993)
). And, while Ja mes Daniel Good Real Property was an eminently sensible deci sion, it did not tum on the punitive nature of forfeiture. See infra notes 97-99 and accompa nying text for a discussion of the holding in Ja mes Daniel Good Real Property.
In Part I of this review, I will therefore attempt to sketch a con stitutional theory for determining under what circumstances gov ernments may forfeit property in civil, as opposed to criminal proceedings. Levy's historical discussion in A License to Steal indi cates that through much of this country's history, civil forfeiture op erated, with rare exceptions, within the rather narrow confines of revenue and admiralty law and the war-making power. Civil forfei ture was used almost exclusively to redress violations of revenue and maritime offenses and to provide a legal mechanism for seizing enemy property in wartime. Most of the significant expansion in the use and scope of civil forfeiture has occurred in the last two decades.
Part I of this review will describe those three traditional uses of forfeiture and their rationales as expressed in judicial opinions. I will then argue that the long history of these three uses of forfeiture -together with the special circumstances that justified those uses -provides a solid foundation for a due process-based limitation regarding the use of forfeiture. Finally, I will show how the Supreme Court has largely overlooked the historical limitations on the scope of civil forfeiture, with the result that its constitutional analysis of forfeiture has become riddled with contradictions.
Under the most far-reaching due process limitation that the Court could adopt, the use of civil in rem forfeiture outside its tradi tional applications in the revenue, maritime, and wartime fields would simply be prohibited as a general matter. If forfeiture were to be used as a sanction for the commission of an offense, it would have to be administered in a criminal proceeding that was con ducted with the full panoply of procedural protections that apply in such proceedings. is Implementation of such a limitation would have profound ramifications for the law of forfeiture. It would render unconstitu tional much of the significant extension of civil forfeiture that has occurred at the state and federal level in the last two decades, and would greatly restrict further expansion. Furthermore, it would eliminate many of the doctrinal contradictions that abound in the Court's constitutional decisions involving civil forfeiture. But the historical analysis undertaken by Levy will also support less ambi tious constitutional objectives than the "criminalization" of a signif icant class of forfeitures. Recognition of the limited scope of and rationale for the early forms of forfeiture would aid the Court in fashioning specific due process protections for civil forfeiture pro ceedings, even if they remained civil in form. While not as far reaching as the criminalization of forfeiture, the incremental fash-18. Like any legal rule, the one I am proposing would not be without exceptions. See infra note 45 for a discussion of one narrow exception to such a rule. [Vol. 96:1910 ioning of particular due process protections can still go a long way toward eliminating some of the worst abuses of civil forfeiture.
In Part II of this review, I will propose a specific incremental change to civil forfeiture that Levy and many others regard as abso lutely fundamental -namely, the creation of a constitutional pro tection for innocent owners. I will show how such a protection can be derived from longstanding substantive due process principles that were widely accepted by the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868. My essay will trace the development of the substantive component of due process in judicial opinions and other extra-judicial sources in the Nineteenth Century. It will conclude by suggesting that one of the animating principles behind the devel opment of substantive due process -the belief that private prop erty should not be arbitrarily taken by the government -remains very much alive today. That principle, as embodied in the Due Pro cess Clause, requires the adoption of a protection for innocent own ers in forfeiture cases.
A. Tr aditionally, Civil Fo rfeiture Has Been Confined to Revenue,
Maritime, an d Wa r Power Matters
Before the American Revolution, the English regularly used civil in rem forfeiture in the Colonies to redress violations of cus toms and admiralty law. Foremost among these in rem forfeitures were those administered pursuant to the English Navigation and Trade Acts.19 Under these Acts, forfeitures of cargo -and, in some cases, entire ships -could be imposed for violations of a complex array of customs regulations governing trade between England and the Colonies.2 0 By 1700 or shortly thereafter, Colonial courts -that is, common law courts and the vice-admiralty courts -were "regularly exercis [ing] 25. P. 40; see also GREENE, supra note 22, at 321. [Vo l. 96:1910 Confederate side in the Civil War,26 and the Prize Act, which pro vided for judicial proceedings to formalize the capture of Confeder ate prizes.27
The longstanding use of in rem forfeiture rather than civil or criminal in personam proceedings for violations of customs and maritime law rests in significant part on a single factor that is com mon to all three types of forfeitures. That factor is that at least some of those whose property is subject to forfeiture -and per haps most of them -are persons or entities over which an Ameri can court will typically have no personal jurisdiction. When that is the case, traditional civil or criminal in personam proceedings to satisfy a claim for restitution or to impose a fine or other penalty will be unavailing.
With respect to customs regulation, for example, a seller or con signor of goods is typically a foreign person or entity. Criminal and civil fines for customs violations generally have no extraterritorial application and, in any event, a foreign seller who violates such laws will frequently be outside an American court's jurisdiction.28 If the seller has committed a customs offense, say by preparing invoices which understate the purchase price of the goods, forfeiture of the goods may be the only practical way to exact the equivalent of a civil or criminal fine from the seller, at least where the seller has retained title to the goods, as in a consignment sale.29 GREAT REBELLION 195, 196-98 (2d ed. 1865) . ulent undervaluing of merchandise so as to avoid payment of duties, the use of "a proceeding against the res, " rather than a criminal action, is appropriate because of "the very fact that the criminal provision does not operate extraterritorially against the consignor"); see also HARPER, supra note 20, at 111 (noting that the use of in rem proceedings in English customs cases "proved valuable ... because the authorities could more often lay their hands upon smuggled merchandise than upon the smugglers"). Of course, in a case in which the foreign seller has no complicity in a customs law violation perpetrated by the buyer or consignee, or where a culpable seller has already transferred title to the goods to the buyer upon their entry into the importing country, then the forfeiture would not truly be functioning as a substitute for imposition of an in personam criminal or civil fine on the seller. But in many cases it may not be easy for customs officials to ascertain whether the importer, the foreign seller, or some other party, owns the goods in question -and which party or parties is responsible for a violation -especially if the seller is thousands of miles away and not within the subpoena power of the courts. For that reason, the government could arguably justify the Scholars have also pointed to the unavailability of ordinary in personam civil and criminal processes for many maritime offenses in explaining the longstanding use of forfeiture in those cases. The distinctive feature of maritime activities is that they take place on the oceans, "where sovereignty either does not exist, or is in dis pute,"30 and that, "more often than not ... the owner of a vesselor sometimes even the crew . : .
See
[is] not reachable by the laws of any nation against which some offence or injury was alleged on the part of that vessel and its owners. "3 1 As such, civil in rem forfeiture was often the only practical method for satisfying claims against foreign persons or entities arising out of violations of admiralty law.32
A similar argument was also offered to justify the use of in rem forfeiture in the wartime confiscation cases that arose in connection with the Revolutionary War,33 31 . Fm kelstein, supra note 30 , at 231 ; see also 4 BE NEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 607, at 177 (6 th ed. 1940 ) (" [I] n a great variety of ... cases [involving violations of the laws of tr ade, navigation, and revenue committed on navigable waters] , the vessels and the goods alone ar e within the reach of the pr ocess of the courts; the individuals concerned ar e in other countries and ar e not amenable to the civil or cr iminal pr ocesses of our courts." ).
32 . In his separate dissent in Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U. S. 442 (1 996 ), Justice Kennedy acknowledged this feature of admiralty law as pr oviding a justifi cation for forfeitures on the high seas. See Bennis, 516 U.S . at 472 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (" The for feiture of vessels pursuant to the admiralty and mari time law has a long , well-recog niz ed tr adition, evolving as it did from the necessity of finding some source of compensation for inju ries done by a vessel whose responsible owners wer e often . . . beyond the pr actical reach of the law and its pr ocesses. " ). and granted by the Constitution.37 If the war power does properly extend to such confiscations, then the use of an in rem, rather than an in personam proceeding to effect a property confiscation would be justified on the grounds that, as a legal or practical matter, courts in the country undertaking the seizure would have no jurisdiction to entertain an in personam action over a foreign citizen in an enemy state.38
The forfeiture remedy was confined almost exclusively to cus toms, maritime,39 and .war power confiscations through most of the Nineteenth Century, with two principal exceptions. First, the for feiture remedy also began to appear in statutes -mostly state li quor prohibition statutes of the 1840s and 1850s -declaring certain activities to be nuisances and providing for their abatement in equitable proceedings, through injunction or property forfeiture (followed by destruction rather than sale). Such statutes, by using civil, equitable proceedings to enforce the criminal law,40 effected a significant expansion of governmental power and raised serious due process questions.4 1 To be sure, these statutes typically employed See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 672-73 {1887) . In addition to upholding the forfeiture provisions of the Kansas prohibition law, the Mugler court rejected the claim that the provi sion of the statute that forbade the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages also violated due process, insofar as it rendered valueless breweries that had once been lawful to operate.
See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 664. But the soundness of both holdings in Mugler is open to serious doubt. In support of its ruling that these "equitable" forfeitures did not violate due process, the Mugler Court relied heavily on a historical analysis that has proved to be incorrect. In an attempt to show that equitable proceedings of this kind had been used for centuries, the Court quoted Justice Story's treatise on equity for the proposition that "(i]n regard to public nuisances, the jurisdiction of courts of equity seems to have been of very ancient date, and has been distinctly traced back to the reign of Queen Elizabeth." 123 U.S. at 672. In fact, recent legal scholarship demonstrates that that jurisdiction was not established in England until the Nineteenth Century. See J.R. Spencer, Public Nuisance: A Critical Examination, 48 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 55, 67-68 (1989); see also Henry Schofield, Equity Ju risdiction to Abate and in personam, rather than in rem proceedings,42 and the equitable principles from which these statutory actions were derived43 had observed strict rules regarding when destruction of property, as op posed to a mere prohibitory injunction, would be ordered.44 But as equitable proceedings, they were conducted without a jury, and the government's standard of proof was reduced to a preponderance of the evidence. Moreover, in practice, the statutory provisions re garding forfeiture were often mandatory in nature. 45 The second exception was the use of forfeiture for excise tax violations. This use resulted from a change in tax policy during the Civil War years. From the formation of the Republic through the onset of the Civil War, virtually the only tax imposed by the federal ON EQUITY 441 (1948) . This jurisdiction, which as of 1888 was "not frequently exercised," Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 673 {1888), represented a departure from the English common law as it had existed for many centuries. See Spencer, supra note 41, at 59-61, 67-68 {indicating that public nuisances were crimes at early common law and that their abatement for many centuries was almost exclusively a matter for the criminal courts until the early Nineteenth Century, when English equity courts first began to issue injunctions to abate public nuisances in suits brought by the attorney general).
44. While the usual remedy at common law for public nuisance abatement was a prohibi tory injunction, courts would order destruction of property in extreme cases if that was the only way to abate a nuisance. See JoHN N. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITABLE REMEDIES § 534, at 915 {1905); We lch v. Stowell, 2 Doug. 332, 343 (Mich. 1846) {holding that municipality's destruction of house used for prostitution activities was unlawful because it exceeded what was "absolutely necessary to abate the nuisance" and failed to "protect ... the rights of property, which should be held sacred"). That common law limitation on de struction of property as a remedy for nuisance abatement has continued to this day. See, e.g., City of Minot v. Freelander, 380 N.W.2d 327, 324 (N.D. 1986) ("[D] estruction of property is a drastic remedy, and it must necessarily be a remedy of last resort ... ").
45. In addition to the power to abate public nuisances, it was generally recognized by the Nineteenth Century that states also had the power to destroy private property, without pay ing compensation to the owner, in times of "great public calamity." Morr, supra note 41, at 344. The principal examples of that era were to prevent property from falling into the hands of the enemy during war, and to prevent conflagrations from spreading through a commu nity. Id. at 344-45 & nn.43-44; see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 & n.16 (recognizing states' power at common law to abate public nuisances and to "destr [oy] ... real and personal property, in cases of actual necessity, ... to forestall ... grave threats to the lives and prop erty of others," without providing compensation to property owner) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). [Vol. 96:1910 government -and hence the only revenue measure for which it utilized the forfeiture sanction -was the tariff .46 When Congress enacted a comprehensive scheme of excise taxes on domestically produced goods during the Civil War,47 however, a provision for forfeiture was included.48
It appears that Congress did not begin using civil forfeiture outside the admiralty, revenue, and war power fields in any signifi cant way until the advent of Prohibition in 1920.49 But even during 46. There were a few excise taxes imposed by Congress in 1791 and 1794, and a stamp tax was imposed on various legal instruments in 1797. But these taxes were met with considera ble opposition, of which the so-called Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania was a part, and the entire system was repealed in 1802. The War of 1812 led to the reintroduction of some of these taxes, but they were abandoned in 1818. See See, e.g., 96 U.S. at 400, 401-02, 404 (1877) . On the other hand, if such a due process argu ment had been made, the Court might have countered it by asserting that the collection of the tax revenues is essential to the functioning of government. Recently, the Supreme Court has distinguished revenue forfeitures {including those based on failure to pay excise taxes) from drug forfeitures on precisely the grounds that "[t]he prompt payment of taxes ... may be vital to the existence of government." United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 60 {1993) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 621 (1885) (noting that certain internal revenue measures passed during the Civil War were "adopted at a period of great national excitement, when the powers of government were subjected to severe strain to protect the national existence"). Indeed, at about the time Dobbins's Distillery was decided, the federal government was facing some thing of a crisis in the collection of federal excise taxes on alcohol. After the end of the Civil War, the illicit distillin g of spirits became a common means of defrauding the government out of the alcohol tax, particularly in the southern states, where opposition to the government still ran high. See ALBERT s. BOLLES, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES , 1861 TO 1885, at 435-36 {1888). According to Bolles, "In some of the districts where illicit distilling was extensively practiced, leading citizens were either directly interested in the business, or were in active sympathy with the distillers .... " Id. at 436. In his annual report for 1878, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue reported that "twenty-six officers and employees were killed, and forty-seven wounded, while engaged in enforcing the internal revenue laws." Id.
at 437 (quoting from Report (internal quotation marks omitted)). He reported that, "as a rule, no efforts were made on the part of the State officers to arrest the murderers .... " Id.
at 438 (quoting from Report (internal quotation marks omitted)). Prohibition, most liquor-related forfeitures were effected under the forfeiture provisions of the internal revenue laws, rather than those contained in the Vo lstead Act, which were more in the nature of criminal forfeiture provisions.so With the repeal of Prohibition in 1932, the use of civil forfeiture in criminal law enforcement waned considerably, at least at the federal level. But civil forfeiture gained new prominence in the 1980s, when the federal government began using it aggressively in the enforcement of laws prohibiting or regu lating the possession or sale of controlled substances.51 To day, as Levy points out, there are more than 150 federal civil forfeiture provisions.52 Some of these statutes punish conduct that is specifi cally made criminal by another statute. Others, while they do not predicate forfeitures on conduct that is the subject of a separate criminal statute, nevertheless impose forfeitures for offenses of a kind that formerly would have been made the subject of a criminal statute, instead of an in rem forfeiture proceeding. Analogous for feiture statutes are increasingly appearing at state and local levels.
B. A Due Process Prohibition Against the Use of Civil Fo rfeiture Outside Its Tr aditional Domains
In this section, I will suggest a due process-based prohibition against certain uses of civil -as opposed to criminal -forfeiture that draws on the historical analysis presented in the preceding sec tion. The due process limitation I am proposing starts from the self- To that extent, it could be defended on due process grounds. 50. Although the Volstead Act provided for the in rem forfeiture of boats or vehicles used in the unlawful transportation of liquor, the statute required that the person "in charge" of the boat or vehicle be convicted criminally before a forfeiture could be effected, and it also That law authorized the forfeiture of conveyances "used in the removal or for the deposit or concealment" of liquor "with the intent to defraud" the United States of (liquor) taxes, with out the requirement of a criminal conviction and without regard to the innocence of an owner or lienor. See id. at 131.
51. Congress included a provision authorizing the forfeiture of conveyances (e.g., automobiles, boats, and airplanes) for violations of federal drug law in 1970. See Act of 1970 , ch. 511, 84 Stat. 1236 , 1276 -78 (1970 (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (1994) [ Vol. 96:1910 evident proposition that civil forfeiture serves criminal law objec tives. As the Supreme Court has said, "[A] forfeiture proceeding is quasi-criminal in character," and "[i]ts object, like a criminal pro ceeding, is to penalize for the commission of an offense against the law."53 Seizing a person's property because he or she used it in the commission of a ·crime, even when that property has many legiti mate uses, is in this respect the equivalent of a criminal fine,54 albeit a fine that exhibits a rather arbitrary variability in amount from case to case.55 As such, civil forfeiture is quite clearly designed to serve the criminal law objectives of deterrence and retribution.56
Because of the difficulty of obtaining in personam jurisdiction over perpetrators of certain classes of crime, our legal tradition long ago accepted the use of in rem forfeiture actions as a sanction for certain limited classes of violations of law. As discussed at length above, forfeiture was used to redress violations of maritime and revenue law, and to facilitate the confiscation of enemy property in wartime. Civil forfeiture, then, was viewed a narrow exception to the basic requirement that criminal proceedings (with all of the pro cedural protections that have come to be associated with such pro ceedings) be used to enforce the criminal law.
The notion that government may use "civil" proceedings to en force the full spectrum of criminal law offenses is simply not an established part of our legal tradition. It is easy to understand why. For if governments could indiscriminately use civil forfeiture as a tool for enforcing the criminal law, it would, as Justice Field warned more than 12 5 years ago, "work[ ] a complete revolution in our criminal jurisprudence. "57
The use of civil ,in. rem forfeiture proceedings, rather than crimi nal proceedings, to enforce the criminal law plainly must have some limits. Could the state, for example, authorize in rem forfeiture proceedings of homes where there is merely "probable cause" to believe that the home was used to facilitate a homicide or a larceny, or of cars where there is "probable cause" to believe that the owner was driving while impaired?
Ju stice Kennedy observed recently that the· Court "would not allow a State to evade its burden of proof by replacing its criminal law with a civil system in which there is no presumption of inno cence and the defendant has the burden of proof."58 If that is true, then surely the Court would not permit government to create a comprehensive, parallel system of criminal law enforcement that utilized in rem forfeiture proceedings to punish for criminal of fenses, even if such a system did not formally "replace" the entire system of criminal prosecutions, but was merely an adjunct to it. Giving prosecutors the option of using such a comprehensive scheme of in rem forfeiture remedies -whether as a supplement to traditional criminal prosecutions or in place of them (when, for ex ample, they were unwillin g or unable to meet the higher burdens associated with criminal prosecutions) -would seem to subvert our entire criminal justice system.59 But this is precisely the general direction in which state and federal governments seem to be heading.
We can, I think, all agree as a general matter that the use of civil, rather than criminal procedures, to administer the criminal law "offends [a] principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental"60 -and, as such, violates due process. That said, if civil proceedings in some circumstances have historically been used to enforce the criminal law, it would be more difficult (though by no means imp ossible)61 to establish that similar modern uses of those civil proceedings vio late due process. In the case of civil forfeiture, however, there is no longstanding tradition for using civil forfeitlire outside the mari time, revenue, and war power fields. If a modern application of 58. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U. S. 71, 94 {1992) {K ennedy , J., di ssenting). 59. To be sure, in rem forfei tur e can only be used as a law enforcement tool wher e the wrongdoer' s pr operty is somehow involved in the commission of a cri me. But many courts, incl uding the Supr eme Court, have requir ed only the most tenuous relati onshi p between pr oper ty and a cr ime in or der to forfeit it on that basis. See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Pr operty, 510 U. S. 43 , 82 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurr ing i n par t and di s senting in part) (stating that under the federal dr ug forfeiture statute, "large tr ac ts of land [and any impr ovements thereon] which have no connecti on with cr ime other than being the location wher e a dr ug tr ansacti on occ urred ar e subj ec t to forfei ture" ) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) {fi rst alter ati on in or igi nal); see also Bennis, 516 U. S. at 446 (up holding forfeiture of wife' s interest in car based on husband' s si ngl e use of car for liaison with a pr ostitute).
60 . Sny der v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (193 4) . 61. See Pacific Mut. Li fe Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U. S. 1, 18 {1990 ) (noting, in the context of a due pr oc ess chal lenge, that "nei ther the antiquity of a pr acti ce nor the fact of steadfa st legisl ative and judici al adherence to it through the centuries insulates it from constitutional attack" ) (quoting Wi lliams v. Illinoi s, 399 U. S. 235 , 239 {1970 ) (intern al quotati on marks omitted)).
ci v il fo r feitu r e outside its tr aditional domains depended on the same r a tionale that justi fi ed the tr aditional uses -the inability to obtain in personam ju r isdiction ov er the wr ongdoe r -pe r haps it could pass muste r unde r the Du e Pr ocess Clause . But absent that , the contempo r ar y extensions of ci v il fo rfeitu r e should be con demned as a vi olation of due pr ocess . If go v er nment wishes to use fo r feitu r e as a sanction fo r enfo r cing the cr iminal law , it should be compelled to use cr iminal fo r feitu r e pr oceedings , in which all of the customa r y pr ocedu r al sa fegua r ds ar e applicable .
C. In Its Tr eatment of Civil Fo rfeiture, the Supreme Court Has Largely Overlooked the Constitutional Significance of the His torically Narrow Scope of Civil Fo rfeiture
Ni neteenth-Century Cases
At one time in ou r constitutional histo r y, it appea r s that the Sup r eme Cou r t would ha v e accepted the vi ew that , while the use of ci v il fo r feitu r e in the administ r ation of tax and admi r alty law was pe r fectly constitutional , its use to enfo r ce othe r penal statutes would vi olate due pr ocess . In 1871, when the Cou r t decided Miller v. United States, 6 2 it suggested in dicta that for fe iting pr ope r ty in a ci v il pr oceeding whose pu r pose was to " p unish off enses " against the United States would not compo r t wit h the Du e Pr ocess Clause of the Fif t h Am endment . Miller in v ol v ed a constitutional challenge to the Ci v il Wa r Con fi sc ation Ac ts enacte d by the Union Go v ern ment in 1861 and 1862. The 1861 Ac t pr ov ided f o r the fo r f ei tu r e of pr op er ty used , or intended to be used to aid , abet , or pr omote the Con fede r acy in the Ci v il Wa r.63 It contained no cr iminal pr ov isions . The 1862 Ac t contained both cr iminal pr ov isions ( which pr ov ided fo r the imposition of fin es , imp r isonment , and death ) and ci v il fo r feitu r e pr ov isions . Am ong the cr iminal off enses de fi ned by the 1862 Ac t was gi v ing "a i d and comfo r t to ... [ the] r e bellion ."64 The ci v il for fe itu r e pr ov isions of the Ac t also autho riz ed the con fi sca tion of pr ope r ty of , inter alia, all such pe r sons . 65 The Ac t pr ov ided that the f o r feitu r e pr oceedings we r e to be conducted in rem, unde r pr ocedu r es simila r to those used in admi r alty or r e ve nue fo r fe itu r e cases .66
The fo rfeitu r e in Miller was di r ected against ce r tain stock in a Michigan co r po r ation owned by Samuel Mille r, a r e sident of Vi r gi n ia . The United States alleged in the pr oceeding against the stock rebellion" by fine or imprisonment, the forfeiture provisions, which are triggered by the very same conduct, must also be deemed punishment. As such, he contended, the use of a civil proceeding to administer such a forfei ture offended several constitutional provisions, including the Due Process Clause.
Significantly, the Court in Miller acknowledged that if the pur pose of the forfeiture provisions of the 1861 and 1862 Acts was to "punish offenses against the sovereignty of the United States," then "there would be force in the obj ection that Congress has disre garded the restrictions of the fifth and sixth amendments of the Constitution."67 The constitutional provisions to which the Court was referring included the Due Process Clause, and the Grand Jury Indictment and Jury Tr ial Clauses of the Sixth Amendment. 68 The Court concluded, however, that the forfeiture provisions of the 1861 and 1862 Acts were "not enacted under the municipal power of the Congress to legislate for the punishment of [the crime of treason] ," but were instead a legitimate exercise of "the war powers of the government."69 For that reason, the Court said, the forfei ture provisions of the Confiscation Acts were not subj ect to the Due Process Clause and other restrictions imposed by the Fi fth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution.70
In dissent, Ju stice Field, joined by Ju stice Clifford, expressly adopted the principle which the maj ority had endorsed only in dicta -namely, that the use of civil forfeiture proceedings to punish vio lations of the criminal law was unconstitutional. Ju stice Fi eld be lieved that the Confiscation Acts had made precisely that use of civil forfeiture, because, in his view, its provisions were not directed at "enemies" of the United States, but rather at the property of those guilty of the crime of treason.71 If the government may con fiscate the property of a traitor through an in rem forfeiture pro ceeding, Ju stice Field observed, then logically it would be able to use such civil proceedings "to confiscate the property of the bur glar, the highwayman or the murderer . o r the punishment of crime against the person of the off ender may be disregarded , and proceedings f o r such punishment be taken against his property alone , or that proceedings may be taken at the same time bo th against the person and the property , and thus a dou b le punishment f o r the same off ence be in fil cted ".73
The Miller dicta held out the promise that the Court would , at the very least , confine civil for fe iture to its traditional uses in mari time , customs , and war power confiscation matters , and preclude its general use as an alte rn ative to or supplement to criminal prosecu tion . While that would have be en a logical development , and one justified by the special circumstances in those fields of law that led to the expedient of civil f or f eiture , it has never come to pass . The Court has never held that the use of civil f o rf eiture proceedings to en f orce a penal law is unconstitutional . An d, f o r the most part , it has declined to extend to any kind of civil f o rf eiture proceedings the constitutional sa fe guards in the Bill of Ri ghts that apply to criminal cases .
Fi f teen years af ter the decision in Miller, the Supreme Court ap peared , for a brie f time , to be headed in the direction of applying all of the various constitutional sa fe guards to civil for f eitures , even those eff ected for revenue off enses . In Coffe y v. Un ited States, 14 decided in 1886, the Court held that a judgment of acquittal in a crimi n al proceeding f o r violating the intern al revenue la w s ba rred the United States from br ingi n g a civil f o rf eiture proceeding against property of the criminal de fe ndant that was predicated on the same underl yi ng off ense . By holding th <l; t the acquittal was " c onclusive " of issues in 't he subsequent proceeding , the Court seemed to be em ploying a res judicata analysis .75 But the Court also cited approv ingly to a lower court decision , United States v. McKee, 76 which held that a conviction f o r conspiracy to de fraud the government of taxes ba rred a su b sequent civil action for payment of a penalty equal to dou b le the amount of the taxes due .77 By endorsing the holding in that case , the Court in Coffe y appeared to be saying that f o rf e i ture proceedings in the circumstances of its case were "criminal" for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause,78 which represented a more logical, though potentially more sweeping, basis for its deci sion. For if civil forfeiture in excise cases was "criminal" in this sense, then it would seem that the full panoply of procedural pro tections in criminal cases should apply to civil forfeiture cases.
One month later, the Court in Boyd v. United States79 took an other step in that direction by holding that two constitutional pro tections applicable to criminal proceedings -the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable ·searches and the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause -were applicable to civil forfeiture proceedings. This decision, which was all the more significant because it involved a customs forfeiture, rested primarily on several considerations. First, the Court rejected the proposition that an in rem forfeiture proceeding "is not, in effect, a proceeding against the owner of the property."80 As the Court observed, "[P]roceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man's property by reason of offenses committed by him, though they may be civil in form, are in their nature criminal."8 1 Under the statute at issue in Boyd, the conduct that gave rise to a forfeiture was also a crime; and, in addition, the sanction of forfei ture was available in both a civil in rem proceeding and in a crimi nal prosecution.82 The Court also believed that, in light of the American Colonists' strong opposition to the writs of assistance is sued to customs officers to enforce the English customs regulations, the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures was clearly intended to apply to such proceedings.83 As for the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the Court believed that wrongfully obtaining an individual's per sonal papers for the purpose of using them as evidence against him 78. In his opinion for the Court in Murphy v. Un ited States, 272 U.S. 630 (1926), Justice Holmes acknowledged the Coffey decision, but held that it was inapplicable to a nuisance abatement proceeding under the National Prohibition Act that was co=enced after an ac quittal in a criminal proceeding brought under the same Act. The Court concluded that the purpose of the decree, which closed the defendants' building for a year, is "prevention, not a second punishment that could not be inflicted after acquittal from the first." See Murphy, 272 U.S. at 632. It added that "[t]his seems to us to be shown by the whole scope of the section as well as by the unreasonableness of interpreting it as intended to accomplish a plainly unconstitutional result." Murphy, 272 U.S. at 632. While a strong case can be made for holding that, as a matter of procedural due process, civil forfeiture proceedings must generally be confined to their traditional uses in the maritime, customs, �nd wartime confiscation fields, and that, as a general rule, forfeiture proceedings outside those areas must be criminal in form, the Supreme Court today shows no signs that it is prepared to resolve the contradictions in its forfeiture decisions by adopting such a rule. The Court has, however, at least recognized in a recent case that procedures applicable to customs and excise tax violations do not necessarily pass muster under the Due Process Clause when utilized in other forfeiture contexts. Thus, in United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 96 the Court held that the seizure of real prop erty before obtaining a judgment in a forfeiture proceeding -and without affording the owner prior notice and an opportunity to be 93. 21 U.S.C. § 881{a)(7) {1994) (providing for forfeiture of real property that "is used or intended to be used ... to facilitate the commission of' a drug offense).
94. See Ursery, 518 U.S. at 290. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court rests on the curious proposition that a forfeiture may or may not be punitive in nature and effect, depending on which provision of the Bill of Rights is at issue. See Ursery, 518 U.S. at 287.
95. The contradictions in the Court's recent forfeiture jurisprudence have also been man ifested by conflicting interpretations it has given to prior case law. In Austin, the Court read a series of forfeiture decisions as having been predicated on "the notion that the owner ha [ d) been negligent in allowing his property to be misused." Austin, 509 U.S. at 615. In Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996) , the Court read those very same cases as having permitted forfeiture without regard to owner fault. See Bennis, 516 U.S. at 447-50. (See infra notes 103-08 and accompanying text for a discussion of the holding in Bennis.) The Court's recent forfeiture decisions also reveal starkly conflicting views regarding whether the atavistic "guilty property" fiction has any role in modem constitutional adjudication. The fiction was all but abandoned in Austin, but the Court once again invoked it in Bennis and in Ursery, in rejecting the constitutional claims in those cases. See Bennis, 516 U.S. at 447; Ursery, 518 U.S. at 275 (majority opinion); 518 U.S. at 315 (Stevens, J., concurring in part in the judg ment and dissenting in part). As this review was going to press, the Supreme Court decided a very important forfeiture case, United States v. Bajakj ian, No. 96-1487 , 1998 U.S. LEXIS 4172 (Supreme Court, June 22, 1998 . In an opinion authored by Justice Thomas, the Court in Bajakajian held that a criminal forfeiture of cash under a currency reporting statute vio lated the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. See Bajakajian, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 4172, at *42. Justice Thomas's opinion aptly distinguishes traditional in rem customs forfeitures from both the criminal forfeiture at issue in Bajakajian, see Bajakajian, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 4172 at *20-22, *35-36, and from certain other modem in rem forfeitures, see Bajakajian, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 4172 at *17 n.4, *21 n.6. But the Court's use of the "remedial" and "punitive" dichotomy in drmving that distinction is not very reassuring in light of its failure to apply those concepts consistently in its Ursery and Austin decisions.
510 U.S. 43 (1993).
[ Vol. 96:1910 heard -violated due process,97 even though (as the Court ac knowledged) its precedents permitted the government to make such seizures in, inter alia, revenue cases.98
The kind of incremental approach to fashioning constitutional protections for civil forfeiture cases exhibited by James Daniel Good Real Property is probably the best we can hope for from the Supreme Court.99 Yet even this more modest approach can also benefit from the recognition that in rem civil forfeiture has histori cally been narrowly limited in its scope to revenue, maritime, and war powers matters. Because of that traditional limitation, proce dures that qualify as "due process" in those kinds of forfeiture pro ceedings need not automatically be deemed constitutional in other civil forfeiture settings. And due process precedents involving reve nue, maritime, and war powers forfeitures should not be regarded as controlling in cases involving modern, nontraditional uses of civil forfeiture. Recognition of the traditional scope of civil forfeiture then should, at the very least, afford the Court greater latitude to devise new due process protections for the newer applications of civil forfeiture.100 In the next section of this review, I will propose the adoption of one particular due process protection in civil forfei ture cases that is absolutely basic to our system of justice. 100. That recognition might have led to a different result in Bennis, which rejected, inter alia, a due process-based protection for innocent owners. See Bennis, 516 U.S. 453. With the exception of Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926) , all of the cases relied upon by the Bennis majority, including J. W. Goldsmith-Jr. Grant Co. v. Un ited States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921), were admiralty or revenue cases. Goldsmith-Jr. Grant Co. was decided during the Prohibi tion era, but the forfeiture in that case actually predated national Prohibition and was ef fected under provisions of the excise tax law, rather than the forfeiture provisions of the Vo lstead Act. See supra note 50.
II. A MORE MODEST PROPOSAL: RECOGNITION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR INNOCENT OWNERS DE RIVED FROM OUR LONG TRADITION OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS RESTRICTIONS AGAINST ARBITRARY DEPRIVATIONS OF PROPERTY
In this section of the review, I will propose an incremental con stitutional change to forfeiture that Levy and others regard as fun damental -namely, a protection for innocent owners. Levy argues compellingly that "[t]he worst feature of forleiture ... is its failure to provide adequately for the rights of innocent people" (p. 161). He suggests, without much elaboration, that the "old substantive due process" doctrine (p. 87) would prevent government from forfeiting a blameless person's property, and condemns the Court for "abdicat[ing its] responsibility of judicial review in such cases " 101 A due process-based protection for innocent owners should re quire that the government prove owner culpability at least amount ing to negligence 10 2 in the forfeiture proceedings, or (at the very least) it should afford the owner an affirmative defense based on lack of such culpability. Using Levy's comments as a point of de parture, I will attempt to show how such a protection can be de rived from substantive due process principles that are deeply imbedded in our nation's jurisprudence. I will first trace the devel opment of the substantive component of due process doctrine from its pre-Civil War origins in the Nineteenth Century, and show how the protection against arbitrary takings of private property by gov ernment was central to the doctrine. I will then suggest that the values that animated the development of substantive due process remain very much alive today, and that a straightforward applica tion of the doctrine would yield an innocent owner protection in civil forfeiture cases.
P.
88. An innocent owner or co-owner may be victimized if, after entrusting prop erty to somebody else or othenvise permitting him or her to use it, that person, without the owner's pr ior knowledge or consent, then proceeds to use it to facilitate the commission of an offense. The same may happen when a person receives a gift of property without knowledge that the prior owner has engaged in acts that (u nder the so-called relation-back doctrine) make it forfeitable as of the time of the commission of those acts. 
102.
In cases where one owner's property was misused by another, negligence in entru st ing property would, by analogy to the co=on law tort of negligent entrustment, require that the owner know or should have known of an impending misuse before a forfeiture could be effected. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 308 (1965) . Similarly, in the case of prop erty forfeitable on the basis of act s of a former owner, the minimum level of culpability would be actual or constructive knowledge of the acts of the former owner that rendered it subject to forfeiture, including the former own er' s use of money derived from unlawful activ ities to purchase the property. See Grosfield v. United States, 276 U.S. 494, 499 (1927) (up holding equ itable decree ordering temporary closure of lessors' bu ilding, based on lessee's perpetration of statutory nu isance, but implying that decree would have been reversed if lessors had not "kn[own] of the tenant's violation of law" prior to bringing of suit).
A recent and widely publicized Supreme Court decision, Bennis v. Michigan, 103 crune to a different conclusion regarding the exist ence of a constitutional protection for innocent owners. In Bennis, the Court upheld, by a slim 5-to-4 maj ority, the forfeiture of a wife's interest in a family automobile on the basis that her husband had used it for a liaison with a prostitute. Mrs . Bennis had argued that, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment Ta kings Clause (as incorporated against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment), the forfeiture of her prop erty interest104 was unconstitutional because she neither knew nor should have known that her husband would use the automobile in that fashion.105 She argued that her interest in the car could not be touched by the state and, therefore, that she was entitled to com pensation for it.106 The Court rejected her Due Process and Ta k ings claims, citing what it characterized as a "longstanding practice" permitting such forfeitures.10 1 This section of my review \vill not directly critique the Bennis decision, and will not simply replicate arguments made in the briefs in that case or in Ju stice Stevens's powerful dissent. Instead, it will focus more broadly on the deep roots of substantive due process doctrine in our jurisprudence and the component of that doctrine that protects against arbitrary deprivations of private property. Contrary to the Court's intimations in Bennis, I will conclude that 103. 516 U.S. 442 (1996) . 104. Her interest in the automobile was likened to that of a co-tenant in a tenancy in common. See Tr anscript of Oral Argument at 4, 6, Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996) (94-8729) . If this had been a private proceeding to enforce a judgment against Mrs. Bennis's husband, it is clear that her interest would have been protected. For it is hombook law that a judgment creditor with a judgment against one co-tenant of joint property is only entitled to satisfy the judgment out of the judgment debtor's interest in the property. See, e.g. , 30 AM. JuR. 2o Executions and Enforcement of Judgments § § 171-172 (1994) .
105. In addition to urging the Court to adopt a standard of culpability based on whether the owner knew or should have known that somebody to whom she entrusted property would use it illegally, see Brief for Petitioner at 25, Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996) (No. 94-8729), Mrs. Bennis also argued that, while she would prevail even if she had the burden of proof as to this issue, both the Due Process and Ta kings Clauses required that the burden of proof with respect to that standard of culpability properly rested with the State.
See Brief for Petitioner at 37-45, . While the issue of who should bear the burden of proof with respect to the guilt or innocence of the owner is critical, it is beyond the scope of this review.
106. The order granting forfeiture in Bennis directs the proceeds to be used to pay "the filing fee of this action," "attorney costs," and "all police costs," with "any remaining balance . Before embarking on my discussion of the history of "substan tive" due process, it is worth digressing for a moment ab out the "procedural" and "substantive" dichotomy in due process analysis, because a claimed protection for innocent owners in forfeiture cases resists such easy classification. Modern constitutional analysis generally distinguishes between "substantive" or "procedural" due process in claims brought under either the Fifth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses. "Procedural" due process is said to impose "constitutional limits on judicial, execu tive, and administrative enforcement of legislative or other govern mental dictates or decisions," while "substantive due process" imposes limits "on the content of legislative action." 10 9 While it is certainly useful conceptually, this dichotomy, like the "substance"
108. Space limitations preclude any extensive consideration of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment as a potential constitutional source for a rule that protects blameless own ers from forfeiture. The purpose of the Takings Clause is "to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole," Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) . In Calero To ledo v. Pe arson Ya cht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689-90 (1974) , the Court, citing, inter alia, to the Armstrong principle, declared that it "would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of ... an owner who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property." In Bennis, 516 U.S. at 449-50, the Court repudiated the Calero-Toledo dictum without explaining why it no longer believed, as it did in 1974, that the Armstrong principle would bar a forfeiture of the property of an innocent person. The Ben nis Court quickly disposed of Tm a Bennis's takings claim by stating in so many words that, if the forfeiture passes muster under the Due Process Clause, it must necessarily pass muster under the Ta kings Clause. See Bennis, 516 U.S. at 452-53. But the Court's premise that the Takings Clause is coextensive in scope with the Due Process Clause relies on a string cite to two utterly inapposite cases; and, moreover, runs completely counter to the Court's recent regulatory takings jurisprudence, which has emphasized the status of the Takings Clause as an independent restraint on state power in the Constitution. See Nollan v. California Coastal Commn., 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.3 (1987); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 , 1029 n.14 (1992 . Also relevant to a takings analysis is the Court's holding in Lucas that the use of "confiscatory regulations" that exceed either co=on law limits on the power of the state to abate public nuisances, or the power to destroy real and personal property in cases of actual necessity involving grave threats to the lives and property of others, see supra note 45, will give rise to a compensable taking. If a forfeiture under a nuisance-abatement statute of the kind involved in Bennis does not fall within those two traditional powers, then there is a powerful argument that the forfeiture should be treated as a compensable taking under Lucas, at least with respect to an innocent owner or co-owner. See supra note 44; see also Grosfield v. United States, 276 U.S. 494, 499 (1927) (implying that statutory nuisance abatement action requires proof of owner's knowledge of nuisance committed by another, despite absence of such a requirement in the statute).
109. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-7, at 664 & n.4 (2d ed. 1988). [Vol. 96:1910 and "procedure" dichotomy used in other areas of the law,110 has its limitations. Given the multifarious nature of legal rules and other governmental action that may effect a deprivation of "life, liberty, or property," whether a particular due process claim falls into one category or the other is not always clear,111 and may even be a func tion of how the issue is framed. 1 1 2 A claimed protection for innocent owners in forfeiture cases that is grounded in the Due Process · Clause avoids easy classifica tion, especially if one believes, on procedural due process grounds, that civil forfeiture outside the maritime, customs, and war power fields is illegitimate, and that any such forfeitures should be admin istered in criminal proceedings only.113 For if criminal proceedings were used to effect a forfeiture, the government would almost al ways be charging a property owner with some criminal offense as the basis for the forfeiture, in which case the issue of whether an innocent owner's property may be forfeited would not arise.114 But if the issue is framed simply as whether a particular forfeiture stat-110. For example, the conceptual difficulties experienced by courts in applying the proce duraUsubstantive distinction of Erie Railroad Co. v. To mkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) , are well known.
111. An example of a due process issue that defi es easy classification is whether the state may shift the burden of proof regarding a traditional element of a crime. See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 685-86, 704-05 (1975) (holding that state had to bear the burden of proof as to element of malice in homicide prosecution).
112. Substance and procedure are interrelated anyway, inasmuch as the purpose of a par ticular procedural protection accorded to a party in an adjudicatory proceeding is usually to advance a substantive goal. Very often, that purpose is to eliminate, as much as possible, the risk of erroneous findings of culpability or liability in a judicial or administrative proceeding.
See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 78 (1986) (alluding to the "host of [procedural] safe guards" that "diminish the risk of erroneous conviction"). Thus, the very existence of a par ticular procedural pro�ection that has been held applicable to a particular set of cases -say, the due process requirement that the state prove guilt in a criminal case beyond a reasonable doubt -may imply the existence of certain substantive due process rights, such as the right of a person the government knows or believes to be innocent not to be subjected to punishment.
113. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
114. To be sure, one can imagine a criminal forfeiture statute that targets owners who entrust their property to other persons, who in turn use the property to facilitate an offense. But one would expect such a statute to assume the form of a typical accessory liability stat ute, which would require as an element of the offense some complicity in the offense giving rise to the forfeiture. Otherwise, the statute would be imposing a kind of vicarious criminal liability, which was unknown at common law here, and today is almost unheard of in our statutory criminal law, except with respect to the special case of corporations, which can be held liable for the acts of their agents. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusnN W. Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 251-52, 254-58 (2d ed. 1986 ). In his classic article on vicarious criminal liability, Professor Sayre observed that " [v] icarious liability is a conception repug nant to every instinct of the criminal jurist." Francis B. Sayre, Criminal Responsibility fo r the Acts of Another, 43 HARV. L. REv. 689, 702 (1930) . Of course, the civil forfeiture of an innocent owner's property on the basis of acts of another person itself imposes a kind of vicarious punitive liability on the owner. And since the owner in a civil proceeding has far fewer procedural protections than he would in a criminal proceeding, the imposition of vica rious punitive liability in the context of a civil forfeiture is to that extent even more objec tionable than its use in a criminal proceeding would be.
ute must include owner culpability as one of the elements giving rise to a forfeiture, the claim would appear to be substantive in na ture. On the other hand, if the issue is framed as whether the owner should be afforded a procedure for asserting an innocent owner defense in a forfeiture proceeding (or whether the govern ment should have to prove fault), the claim begins to sound more like a procedural due process claim. Other variations in formulat ing the issue lead to further enigmas of classification. For example, in a case like Bennis involving jointly owned property, the issue could be framed narrowly as whether the forfeiture, without com pensation, of an innocent co-owner's interest in property, on the basis of a co-owner's misuse of it, violated due process. Under that formulation, the proper classification of the due process claim would depend on whether the requirement to pay compensation for certain property deprivations is best regarded as a procedural or substantive limitation on governmental power. Regardless of how a constitutional protection of this kind should be characterized, the notion that due process should protect private property from arbitrary confiscation by government has deep roots in our constitutional and social history that continue to this day.115 Statements evincing the need to protect private prop erty from arbitrary takings began appearing in Supreme Court opinions very soon after the Court was formed. In its 1798 decision in Calder v. Bull, 11 6 the Supreme Court held that a special act of the Connecticut legislature that retroactively granted a new trial in a probate case did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Consti tution. While upholding the law, Justice Samuel Chase's opinion for the Court included this famous quotation regarding the limits of the authority of state legislatures:
An Act of the Legislature {for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a 115. For much of the discussion of Nineteenth-Century case law that follows, I have re lied heavily on Professor Edward Corwin's superb but somewhat forgotten 1948 book, Liberty Against Government. That book traces the history of substantive due process from its Roman and English origins to its early development in the period preceding and following the Civil War, where it operated as a bar to arbitrary deprivation of private property, and then to its signifi cant expansion in the so-called Lochner era of Supreme Court jurispru dence, from 1905 to 1937, where it operated primarily as a restraint on regulation that was said to impair the liberty of contract of employers. The Lochner-era jurisprudence, with its expansive notions of the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause, has, of course, long been discredited. But the idea that due process protects against arbitrary deprivations of "property" is, as I will show in this review, an enduring one in our constitutional tradition.
116. Under an interpretation of the Due Process Clause that came to be embraced in varying degrees by members of the bar, judges, and the general public, the "due" -or "just" -process required to deprive a person of property had to be judicial in nature. More over, in order to qualify as "due" process, the judicial proceeding had to be one that both observed traditional judicial procedures and applied accepted general principles of the criminal and civil law for divesting a person of his property. A caveat to this requirement was that states could seize private property for a public purpose, but they had to pay just compensation to the affected property owner. 11 8
Several state court decisions applying the "law of the land" clauses in their state constitutions, which were a counterpart to the federal Due Process Clause, helped foster this interpretation of due process in the early Nineteenth Century. 11 9 In 1804, in University of North Carolina v. Fo y, 120 the North Carolina Supreme Court de clared legislation that repealed an earlier grant of lands to the Uni versity void under the "law of the land" clause of the state 117. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388. 118. See generally CORWIN, supra note 115, at 80 (discussing Chancellor Kent's famous and influential Commentaries on American Law).
119. The "law of the land" clauses in the early state constitutions were usually taken almost verbatim from chapter 29 of the Magna Carta of 1225, which provided that "[n]o free man shall be taken or imprisoned or deprived of his freehold or of his liberties or free cus toms, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, nor shall we go upon him, nor shall we send upon him, except by a legal judgment of his peers or by the law of the land." See  CORWIN Henderson, 12 3 held that the "law of the land" clause in the New York Constitution meant that "before a man can be de prived of his property, 'it must be ascertained judicially that he has forfeited his privileges, or that someone else has a superior title to the property he possesses."' 1 2 4
The U.S. Supreme Court offered a consistent, if somewhat more abstract, construction of a state law of the land clause in an 1819 case in which the Court was asked, inter alia, to determine whether the Maryland Constitution 1 2 5 was violated by a statute which pro vided banks with a summary remedy for the collection of notes pay able to them. 126 The Court rejected the claim because, in its view, the maker of the note had contractually relinquished his rights to the "ordinary administration of justice." 1 2 1 But the Court went out of its way to explain the meaning of the law of the land clause in a way that suggested it contained a substantive limitation on state power:
As to the words from Magna Charta, incorporated into the constitu tion of Maryland, after volumes spoken and written with a view to their exposition, the good sense of mankind has at length settled down to this: that they were intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and distributive justice .1 28 [Vol. 96:1910 The 1856 New York case of Wy nehamer v. State of New Yo rk1 2 9 occupies an extremely prominent place in the development of due process restrictions against the arbitrary taking of property by the government. In that case, the State of New York enacted a prohibi tion statute which forbade all owners of intoxicating liquors to sell them under any con ditions save for medicinal purposes, forbade them further to store such liquors when not designed for sale in any place but a dwelling house, made the violation of these prohibitions a misdemeanor, and denounced the offending liquors as nuisances and ordained their de struction by summary process.130
In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held, inter alia, that, in its application to liquor owned and possessed prior to the enactment of the law, the New York intemperance law deprived persons of property with out due process of law. 131
The various opinions in Wy nehamer made clear that a judicial process that followed the customary procedures was not necessarily enough to constitute "due process." For if the deprivation of prop erty was based on "no offense, except the misfortune of being [an] owner," 1 32 the use of "a process and tribunal" 1 33 would not avoid a violation of due process. 1 34
The Wy nehamer decision was regarded as "epoch-making" 1 3 S very soon after it was announced, and received what Professor Corwin described as a "resounding" 1 3 6 endorsement a year later in Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford. 131 In dejustice." Distributive justice is a philosophic concept of Aristotelian origin which refers to the rules by which "a society ... should allocate its scare resources or products among [the] individuals ... " who comprise it. See JOHN E. ROEMER, THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 1 (1996) . A number of theories of distributive justice have been propounded in recent years, including Rawlsian theory and neo-Lockean theories of the kind advanced by Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State, and Utopia. See ROEMER, supra, . By "established princi ples" of distributive justice, the Court in Okely presumably meant the prevailing common law rules regarding the acquisition and transfer of property by private persons, and its divest iture through the operation of recognized tort and criminal law rules. As such, an "arbitrary exercise of [governmental] Despite some recent suggestions to the contrary by Justice Scalia,139 the Dred Scott case was not the first time the Supreme Court (or one or more of its justices) had invoked substantive due process. In Bloomer v. McQuewan, 140 the Court interpreted an 1845 act of Congress which extended the life of patents by seven years, from 1849 to 1856, so as to avoid a construction which would have entailed a violation of substantive due process. The issue was whether the Act of 1845 protected the licensee under a patent for a machine (by extending the license during the period of extension), or was solely for the benefit of the owner of the patent. In inter preting the Act of 1845 so as to protect the licensees, the Court said that any contrary construction, by depriving them of their right to use the patented machines, "certainly could not be regarded as due process of law."141 The Court's landmark 1870 decision in Hepburn v. Griswold, 1 4 2 which held the Civil War "Greenback" legislation unconstitutional, also made use of substantive due process. Under that legislation, Congress authorized for the first time the issuance of paper cur rency not backed by specie, and declared it to be legal tender for all debts public and private. Those notes depreciated in value after their issuance and thus were worth less in gold coin than their face value.143 In Hepburn, the petitioner, Mrs. Hepburn, made a prom issory note to Griswold prior to passage of the Legal Tender Act, and tendered the amount owed in paper notes (rather than gold coin) in satisfaction of the debt to Griswold, who refused the tender. On a 4-to-3 vote, the Supreme Court held the Legal Tender [Vol. 96:1910 
C. Substantive Due Process Principles Require the Adoption of an Innocent Owner Protection in Civil Fo rfeiture Cases
For those who subscribe to a theory of constitutional interpreta tion based on original meaning or original intent, the view that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause had a widely accepted substantive meaning when it was ratified in 1868 must be taken seri ously. 1 54 But even for those who are not strict "originalists," the principle that due process protects citizens from arbitrary takings of property continued to be recognized thereafter,155 and it remains a 154. Justice Scalia, who is a self-professed "originalist" in constitutional interpretation, see SCALIA, supra note 139, at 38, has been strongly critical of the doctrine of substantive due process. See, e.g., id. at 143 n.23. But in light of the conclusions of Professor Corwin and other evidence relating to how the concept of due process was actually being used near the time of the adoption of the Fo urteenth Amendment, his certainty that the original meaning of the Fo urteenth Amendment Due Process Clause did not include a substantive component seems completely unwarranted. See id. ("(Of course I do not believe] that 'due process' meant 'due substance' when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted."). In addition, Justice Scalia's suggestion that any understanding of due process which included a substantive com ponent would necessarily have been an "oxymoron," see United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39 {1994) {Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment), presupposes that the reference to "pro cess" in the Clause is (or was) entirely synonymous with "procedure." But the two words are not synonymous, at least in contemporary usage, and it seems an entirely reasonable use of language to say of a due or "just" judicial "process" that it must satisfy substantive as well as procedural criteria. Indeed, a respected commentator once observed:
More than any other single clause of the Constitution, (the Due Process Clause] seems on its fa ce to guarantee, so far as any such provision can, both universal and personal justice. No doubt the principal reasons are that one synonym of 'due process' is 'j ust' process, and one popular connotation of 'law' is 'right and equity.' The ... substantive element thus is inherent in the terms.
GRAHAM, supra note 146, at 249. Justice Thomas appears to have been using the term "pro cess" in the Due Process Clause to refer to a substantive rather than a procedural legal rule when he suggested in Bennis that the "forfeiture of property without proof of the owner's wrongdoing" satisfies the requirements of due process because it represents "a process of law that can show the sanction of settled usage both in England and in this country." Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 454-55 {1996) {Thomas, J., concurring).
155. In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Cb,icago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) , the Supreme Court engaged in an extensive historical discussion of the development of due pro cess as a restraint on arbitrary takings of property. It stated that, if, as this Court has adjudged, a legislative enactment, assuming arbitrarily to take the property of one individual and give it to another individual, would not be due process of law as enjoined by the Fourteenth Amendment, it must be that the requirement of due process of law in that amendment is applicable to the direct appropriation by the State to public use and without compensation of the private property of the citizen.
166 U.S. at 236. In an echo of statements in the Wy nehamer decision, the Court made clear that effecting such a deprivation through a judicial process would not satisfy due process, absent payment of compensation: Notice to the owner to appear in some judicial tribunal and show cause why his property shall not be taken for public use without compensation would be a mockery of justice. Due Process of law as applied to judicial proceedings instituted for the taking of private property for public use means, therefore, such process as recognizes the right of the owner to be compensated if his property be wrested from him and transferred to the public. vitally important, if somewhat neglected, part of our constitutional tradition. Moreover, judging from the amount and kind of public criticism that greeted the Bennis decision,156 the fundamental American values that underlie this aspect of our constitutional tra dition remain very much alive today.
The implications of the doctrine of substantive due process for recognition of an innocent-owner protection in civil forfeiture cases are straightforward. When the government forfeits the property of a person on the basis of its misuse by another person -and the owner neither knew nor should have known of the misuse -the government has engaged in an arbitrary taking of private property. As the above discussion has shown, the prohibition against arbi trary, uncompensated deprivations of private property has been the central tenet of substantive due process doctrine throughout its his torical development. As such, it should be easy for the Court to conclude that due process requires a constitutional protection for innocent owners in civil forfeiture cases.
156. The Bennis decision was subjected to nearly universal criticism in the op-ed pages of newspapers across the country. A search through the computer service, NEXIS, whose database contains a representative sampling of the nation's newspapers, revealed thirty-three op-ed pieces and editorials that criticized the decision, and only two that supported it An English newspaper summ ed up reaction here by reporting that the Court's ruling "has out raged much of the [United States] ," Henry Miller, Punished Fo r Husband's Romp, EVENING STANDARD (London), Mar. 6, 1996, at 4A. Besides the near-unanimity of opposition to the decision, much of it was expressed in the kind of scathing terms not often seen in connection with a decision of the nation's highest court. See, e.g., Bruce Fein, Benchmarks of Absurdity; A Crim inal Step To o Fa r?, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1996 , at A16 (criticizing decision on the grounds, in ter alia, that "forfeiting the property of owners whose conduct was faultless ... betrays a vindictiveness unworthy of any civilized system of law"); Fo rfeiting All Reason, S.F. [Vol. 96:1910 C ONCLUSION Levy's book demonstrates that, with certain narrow exceptions, civil forfeiture is an aberration in our law whose expansion in the past two decades is threatening to "work a complete revolution in our criminal jurisprudence. " 157 The Supreme Court's response to this threat, Levy further suggests, has not been adequate. But the history of civil forfeiture offers the Court an opportunity to resolve the many contradictions in its forfeiture jurisprudence and to fash ion significant constitutional limitations to the use of civil forfeiture. On due process grounds, the Court could (and in my view should) hold that, outside its traditional domain in maritime, revenue, and war power cases, civil forfeiture would simply be prohibited. Under such a rule, criminal forfeiture would be the only constitutional op tion for governments wishing to use the forfeiture sanction to ad minister the criminal law. Alternatively, recognition of the narrow historical scope of civil forfeiture would at least give the Court greater latitude to fashion particular due process protections for the growing number of expansive applications of civil forfeiture. One such protection that Levy and many others regard as fundamental would prevent blameless owners from having their property for feited. Levy's suggestion that the "old substantive due process" doctrine should be used to develop such a protection is a sound one. A review of the history of substantive due process reveals that it is a deeply imbedded part of our constitutional tradition, and that its core tenet is the prohibition against arbitrary takings of prop erty. A protection for innocent owners in forfeiture cases would follow from a straightforward application of this tenet of substan tive due process.
